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UNCORRECTED PROOF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Punishment and Justice 
 
You argue that insanity destroys, undermines, diminishes man’s capacity to reject 
what is wrong and to adhere to what is right. So does the ghetto—more so.1  
 
Contemporary penal philosophers have in general not been much concerned with the 
consequences of general injustice for their “ideal” theories of just punishment.2 
 
Should the state punish its disadvantaged citizens who have committed 
crimes? In his book Punishment, Communication, and Community,     
Antony Duff suggests not, as he sets out what he takes to be the precon-
ditions of a legitimate system of punishment, namely, the elimination of 
social injustice.3 Duff’s strategy can be seen as a radical departure from 
previous ways of understanding the relationship between social disad-
vantage and just punishment: Norval Morris’s comments, quoted above, 
colorfully characterize a school of thought on the issue as developed by 
Judge David Bazelon in a series of papers.4 On this view, we should see 
deprivation as undermining the capacity of certain individuals, qua citi-
zens, to be held to account.5 Duff, on the other hand, asks us instead to 
see such conditions of deprivation as undermining not the disadvantaged 
individual’s capacity, but rather the state’s punitive authority. 
 I here scrutinize Duff’s argument for the claim that social justice is a 
precondition for the legitimacy of a penal system. While I sharpen an 
                                                 
 1Norval Morris, “Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal,” Southern California Law 
Review 41 (1968): 514-47, p. 521. 
 2Matt Matravers, “‘Who’s Still Standing?’ A Comment on Antony Duff’s Precon-
ditions of Criminal Liability,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2006): 320-30, p. 320. 
 3R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2001). 
 4See David L. Bazelon, “The Morality of Criminal Law,” Southern California Law 
Review 49 (1976): 385-405, esp. p. 389; and “Foreword: The Morality of the Criminal 
Law: The Rights of the Accused,” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 72 
(1981), pp.1143-70. 
 5See also Richard Delgado, “‘Rotten Social Background’: Should the Criminal Law 
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?” Law and Inequality 3 
(1985): 9-90. 
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objection to Duff’s argument,6 I then go on to set forth a new line of ar-
gument in support of the claim that deprivation can threaten the state’s 
legitimate punitive authority. I argue that a penal system must incorpo-
rate certain proportionality principles, and that these principles cannot be 
met in conditions in which citizens suffer from deprivation. The frame-
work I provide focuses on an individual’s blameworthiness, and the just-
ness of the state’s corresponding punishment. While arguing that depri-
vation can diminish blameworthiness, I argue, this does not entail that it 
diminishes responsibility: I thus provide an alternative to the framework 
in which debates about deprivation and justice have tended to be framed. 
 Considerations of social justice have sometimes been mentioned as 
relevant to the justness of certain applications of punishment,7 or aired as 
a problematic consequence of the institution,8 or as a difficulty with the 
justness of procedures within the penal system.9 But with the exception 
of Duff, the consequences of social inequalities for the legitimacy of the 
institution as a whole have not yet been adequately addressed in the phi-
losophical literature, as the quotation from Matt Matravers, above, indi-
cates. I undertake to address these issues here. 
 My strategy is as follows: I first set out the preconditions that Duff 
briefly outlines, focusing on his claims that social disadvantage may un-
dermine the legitimacy of a penal institution (section 1). I then set out 
and sharpen the challenge to Duff’s argument for this precondition (sec-
tion 2). I then advance an independent argument for this precondition, 
which requires attention to the proportionality constraints on the institu-
tion of punishment, and a revision of the framework in which theorists 
have thought about the relationship between deprivation and just pun-
ishment (sections 3 and 4).10  
                                                 
 6See Matravers, “Who’s Still Standing?” 
 7See Wojciech Sadurski, “Distributive Justice and the Theory of Punishment,” Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 5 (1985): 47-59. He expresses the concern that punishment only 
serves to make the already disadvantaged worse off. 
 8See Jean Corston, The Corston Report: Review of Women with Particular Vulner-
abilities in the Criminal Justice System (2007), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/ 
corston-report (accessed February 19, 2009). 
 9See Baldus’s study presented in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see also 
J.L. Eberhardt, P.G. Davies, V.J. Purdie-Vaughns, and S.L. Johnson, “Looking Death-
worthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Out-
comes, Psychological Science 17 (1987): 383-86. 
 10Sarah Buss has advanced a quite different line of argument for a similar conclusion, 
namely, that individuals who have suffered certain deprivations may be excused; see 
“Justified Wrongdoing,” Noûs 31 (1997): 337-69. Her argument focuses on the claim that 
such individuals may, given the entire circumstances of their lives, in fact have reason to 
engage in behavior (e.g., violent fending-off of a threat) that, given different histories, 
they would not have. Her argument focuses on the extent to which the agent’s belief that 
the wrongful action was necessary is reasonable (its justification being found in past cir-
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1. Duff on the Preconditions of Punishment 
 
Theorists have engaged with the question of what conditions must hold 
for a particular application of punishment to an individual to be just. In-
sofar as punishment involves the imposition of hardship or suffering of 
some kind upon individuals, and insofar as the state is charged with im-
posing such hardships, such justification is urgent, for if no adequate jus-
tification can be given, the state is committing gross harms upon its citi-
zens. The question of what justifies the application of a particular pun-
ishment might be understood as a “first-order question”—a question per-
taining to the conditions for just punishment within any particular system 
of punishment. 
 Duff draws our attention, albeit briefly, to the matter of what the pre-
conditions are for the legitimacy of the state’s punitive authority.11 This is 
not a question of what, according to any particular theory, the conditions 
for just application of punishments are. Rather, it is a question of what 
conditions must obtain for it to be appropriate for the state to be involved 
in the meting out of punishments in the first instance. Thus Duff connects 
the question of justifications for punishment with that of political obliga-
tion. While it is clear that the preconditions specified are of particular 
relevance to the communicative theory of punishment that Duff advo-
cates, it is plausible that his comments apply to other theories of punish-
ment.  
 To gain a clearer view of the conditions at issue, and how they con-
nect up with questions of social justice, I briefly set out those specified 
by Duff. The precondition of particular interest here is that concerning 
the standing of the state, and the dependence of this upon social justice.12 
 
1.1. Background, and the focus on preconditions for legitimacy 
 
Duff offers us an ideal theory justification for the punishment of criminal 
offenders: he sets out a model of a political community in which the pun-
ishment of those individuals who have broken the law and been con-
                                                                                                             
cumstances of the agent’s life, in which (e.g.) threats have indeed been followed by abu-
sive behavior). My argument differs significantly from Buss’s, as I focus on the reasons 
that an agent may have for acting in a particular circumstance, without addressing the life 
history of the agent—but my claims are not inconsistent with hers. It is also worth noting 
that Buss does not directly focus on the legal framework, but rather on moral justification 
and excuse. 
 11Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, pp. 179-97. 
 12A note of caution: my argument should be taken in the conditional form: if any 
institution of punishment is to be legitimate, it must satisfy this precondition pertaining to 
social justice (amongst others). This leaves open the possibility that no adequate justifica-
tion exists for penal institutions. 
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victed in the criminal justice system is justified. What does this commu-
nity look like, and what does the justificatory work in explaining why 
imposing hardships on some of its law-breaking citizens is acceptable in 
such a community? 
 Duff envisages a liberal political community of individuals who share 
a commitment to certain core social values (such as autonomy, privacy, 
freedom; commitment to these values leaves room for a pluralism of val-
ues to be consistent with, and pursued beyond, this core). These in-
dividuals are deserving of respect, and as such (ought to) engage with each 
other, as the mechanisms of state (ought also to) engage with them, with a 
certain reciprocal regard.13 This community of mutually respecting agents, 
with a shared set of common values, rationally assents to formal structures 
(such as the law) that express, and enable pursuit of, those values. 
 Criminal action shows not only disregard for the individual wronged 
(by a theft or assault, say), but also disrespect for the values of the com-
munity. This calls for a public response: a condemnation of the action 
that expresses this dual disregard, and a calling to account and censuring 
of the wrongdoer. The law enshrines a condemnation of certain kinds of 
action, and criminal proceedings against a law-breaking individual thus 
provide a systematic and authoritative way of condemning such actions. 
If convicted, punishment of the individual is justified, Duff maintains, by 
the need to communicate censure to the offender—imposing hardships 
upon individuals may be a justified vehicle of communication, which 
aims to provide the offender with the opportunity to recognize the 
wrongness of her action. Importantly, this communication is not unidi-
rectional: punishment also provides the offender with an opportunity to 
convey, through the undertaking of the punishment, an apology, and thus 
repair relations with her community. 
 This cursory outline enables us to see the importance of the role of 
community on Duff’s view. Certain conditions must hold true of a com-
munity for criminal law and subsequent punishment by the state for in-
fractions of it to be justified; namely, the community must be one in 
which its member are normatively included, and addressed as rational 
agents. These preconditions for the justification of the state’s punitive 
authority, which I set out shortly, are instructive in enabling us to see 
how near—or far—our present polities are from the ideal justificatory 
                                                 
 13The emphasis on individual respect is what makes unacceptable for Duff the conse-
quentialist justifications, on which punishment of offenders serves as (uses them as) a 
means of deterring others. Likewise, so that the autonomy and choice of individuals can 
be respected, Duff tends to be against reform views of punishment, according to which 
the individual must come to accept certain values. This also explains his emphasis on 
punishment as providing the opportunity for apology and reparation—the offender must 
always be able to choose not to take up that opportunity. 
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theory Duff articulates. In particular, they ask us to consider whether cer-
tain facts of our societies—such as the presence of disadvantage and cir-
cumstances of deprivation—are departures from the ideal that undermine 
punitive legitimacy. 
 
1.2. The establishment of political obligation 
 
How does Duff, then, get to the claim that social justice is a precondition 
for legitimate state punishment? It is relevant, he claims, to the matter of 
whether or not the state has standing: standing to impose obligations upon 
its citizens, and to call them to answer if those obligations are not met.  
 In order that the state can threaten punishment of or impose it upon its 
citizens, it must be the case that the state can legitimately bind its citi-
zens—that individuals do in fact stand obliged to obey the laws. An ac-
tion can only be counted as a violation of some political obligation if the 
individual is indeed under obligation not to so act in the first place (this 
is not to say that, in the absence of political obligation, there are not 
moral obligations that are violated). What considerations might under-
mine political obligation? States that are not legitimate—that perpetrate 
gross human rights violations, for example, or governments who seize 
power by brutal force—surely lack the authority to impose political obli-
gations upon their citizens (although they may have the power to enforce 
compliance). Duff’s concern here is that if the state excludes citizens, 
then those excluded may not be bound to obey the state.  
 One other way in which exclusion may occur is by suffering social 
disadvantage: “someone who ... has been unjustly disadvantaged and 
excluded by the polity whose law it is, is not bound to regard the law as a 
source of authoritative requirements.”14 Now, Duff draws attention to 
different kinds of exclusion: political, material, normative. Perhaps indi-
viduals are denied voting rights, or are not addressed or treated as moral 
agents, or the state fails in its most minimal but pressing obligations to 
protect and provide for them. It would be illegitimate to treat such indi-
viduals as bound by obligation, Duff claims. Let us consider his claims in 
more detail, for this kind of social disadvantage, and what it means for 
the legitimacy of penal systems, is of central concern here. While Duff 
mentions both cases in which the state inflicts gross rights violations 
upon its citizens and less overtly brutal failures, such as the failure to 
alleviate social disadvantage, the focus here will be on the latter.15 This is 
                                                 
 14Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, p. 184. 
 15Of such cases, Duff writes: “Suppose we come to believe ... that the offenders had 
suffered not only ‘social disadvantage’ but serious, persisting, and systemic injustice. 
They had been excluded from participation in the political life of the community, having 
no real chance to make their voices heard ... They had been excluded from a fair share in, 
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because, first, it is plausible to think that the state loses its legitimacy if it 
brutalizes its citizens; and second, the claim that social injustice or dis-
advantage undermines the state’s authority to punish is more contentious; 
third, as noted, this would provide a quite different framework for think-
ing about justice and disadvantage—one that moves away from a focus 
on an individual’s diminished responsibility. Consider, then, the claim: 
 
(F) Any significant failure of the state to meet its obligations towards its 
citizens undermines the claim that those citizens are obliged to the state 
(and in particular to obey the law). 
 
This claim is supported by the following comments from Duff: 
 
Consider some crimes of the disadvantaged. An impoverished single parent steals clothes 
from a supermarket for her children or defrauds the social security system by concealing 
her earnings ... A homeless couple looking for somewhere to sleep break into an empty 
office building, where they cause some damage to property. Such cases as these rightly 
worry those who are concerned about the problem of doing penal justice in an unjust 
society. Can we honestly say that these people are justly punished if they are brought to 
court for their actions ... But why should we be uneasy about their punishment?16 
 
Those of the Bazelon school of thought, according to which deprivation 
undermines the wrongdoer’s responsibility, might maintain that the dis-
advantaged individuals are not fully responsible for their actions. But, in 
contrast, the rhetorical question on which Duff ends here is intended to 
push us towards the conclusion that (F), above, is true: namely, the fail-
ure of the state with regard to these individuals undermines any obliga-
tion that might otherwise bind them to obey the law. Thus, he claims, it is 
a precondition of any system of punishment that the state can bind its 
citizens, and hold them under obligation to obey its laws. Accordingly, it 
must secure whatever conditions are necessary for the inclusion of citi-
zens in a community that makes demands of and binds under obligation 
individuals to each other and the state. These conditions, Duff thinks, 
plausibly include conditions of social justice, and, in particular, the alle-
viation of social disadvantage, deprivation, and impoverishment that pre-
                                                                                                             
or a fair opportunity to acquire, the economic and material benefits that others enjoy. 
They ... had not been treated, by the state or by their fellow citizens collectively, with the 
respect and concern due to them as citizens ... Can we still say that they are bound by the 
laws of the polity that treats them thus?” (Punishment, Communication, and Community, 
p. 183; my italics). Again, we can suppose that the rhetorical question is intended (al-
though Duff expressly notes that there are no simple answers to such a question) to make 
persuasive for us the thought that unless a citizen, or group of citizens, is treated justly, 
and hence is under obligation to the state—specifically, to obey the laws—the penal sys-
tem and its punishments cannot be applied to them. Duff is clear in noting that this does 
not mean that there are not moral evaluations to be made. 
 16Ibid., pp. 182-83. 
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vent participation in the community. (I return to the matter of social and 
distributive justice shortly.) 
 
1.3. The position of the state 
 
The second precondition Duff sets out helps us to see more clearly why it 
is that he thinks the state loses standing if its citizens suffer from disad-
vantage and deprivation. This issue turns on the state being in a position 
to call the wrongdoer to account. Duff maintains that the offender in 
question must be answerable for her action. One side of this is that the 
individual must have the capacity to answer—to understand the laws, 
and the charges to which she is subject. This thought is familiar. But of 
course answering requires that one answer to someone. In this case, it is 
to the state. Here, as in other small-scale relationships of answerability, 
Duff claims, the state must be in a position to demand an answer for 
wrongdoing. But what must be true of the state if it is to be an institution 
that is in a position to call for an answer? Duff holds that the state must 
itself abide by the values that it, with its laws, seeks to promote and en-
force. We would not deem a persistent liar the appropriate party to call to 
answer, for her action, an individual who has lied. To have the standing 
to do so requires holding and respecting the values to which one is hold-
ing the offender to account. Likewise, if the state fails to abide by the 
values that it demands its citizens to respect—in general, or, as above, 
with respect to the particular citizen in question—then it cannot legiti-
mately call the individual to answer for the alleged wrongdoing.17 
 Clearly, this second precondition and the first are closely related. If 
the state cannot impose political obligations upon its citizens (first pre-
condition), then it cannot hold them to answer (second precondition) for 
failing to meet those (inapplicable) political obligations. This is in part 
because those obligations don’t apply, and in part because the state has 
lost its standing to call its citizens to account. Duff’s comments suggest 
that the state will lose its standing to call its citizens to answer not only if 
it has perpetrated gross injustices, but also when it fails its citizens by 
allowing some of them to suffer disadvantage and deprivation. That is, 
when the state systematically and pervasively fails to adhere to the val-
ues it requires its citizens to adhere to (at base, respect for persons), or 
when the state to some significant degree fails to do so, its standing is 
diminished to the extent that the demand for answerability is under-
mined. It is with this matter of “standing” that problems arise, as I will 
                                                 
 17Matravers (“‘Who’s Still Standing?’”) raises worries with this strategy, to the effect 
that when it is an institution that is calling to account, the integrity of the component 
individuals (or lack thereof) does not affect the integrity of the institution. I set aside this 
worry for now. 
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briefly set out below. First, however, I briefly set out the third precondi-
tion that Duff articulates. 
 
1.4. The language of the law 
 
Finally, if individuals are to be held answerable to the state, if the state is 
to make demands of its citizens and punish them for violations of these 
demands, all this must be conducted in a manner that is transparent and 
understandable to those involved. This means that the state must ensure 
that those involved in the process—in particular, the citizens called to 
answer—are able to comprehend it fully. Thus the onus is on the state to 
ensure that the terms used are not ones alien or incomprehensible to 
those engaged and asked to speak with it. 
 
1.5. Summary 
 
These preconditions are particularly apt in the context of Duff’s commu-
nicative theory of punishment, which places emphasis on the notion of 
political and social inclusion. But it is important to note that these pre-
conditions are not implausible requirements for any theory of punish-
ment: a relationship between the state and the citizen, whereby each is in 
a position to (respectively) impose and undertake clearly understood ob-
ligations, might be necessary for any account of the state’s punitive au-
thority. One way of understanding Duff’s argument is as an attempt to 
provide support for the fairly widely held liberal intuition that there is 
some serious injustice in punishing those individuals who are already 
seriously disadvantaged, especially where that disadvantage has played 
some causal role in the criminal act.  
 Should we explain this intuition with reference to the diminished re-
sponsibility of the wrongdoer? Perhaps there are some cases in which an 
agent’s responsibility-relevant capacities are undermined by the dire cir-
cumstances of disadvantage.18 But there is something troubling and in-
sulting to suppose that, generally speaking, the responsibility and capaci-
ties of individuals in poverty are diminished. Moreover, the importance 
of an inclusive political community should disincline us from claiming 
that those disadvantaged individuals are not fully responsible agents; 
rather, on Duff’s view, it is the state whose standing is undermined—
hence the injustice of the state’s punishment of disadvantaged citizens. 
However, in the following section, I will show that Duff’s way of sub-
stantiating this intuition is unsatisfactory. 
                                                 
 18For a sensitive and careful outlining of how this might occur, see Richard L. Lippke, 
“Diminished Opportunities, Diminished Capacities: Social Deprivation and Punishment,” 
Social Theory and Practice 29 (2003): 459-85. 
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2. Matravers on Calling to Account 
 
Whether or not the state has the standing to impose an obligation upon its 
citizens, and call them to account for subsequent violation of this obliga-
tion, is an all-or-nothing matter. A state either can or cannot impose an 
obligation—it cannot impose obligation “more or less.” Likewise, the 
state either can or cannot call its citizens to answer and subsequently (if 
determined by the judiciary) punish those who have culpably broken the 
law. Consider the state that systematically and pervasively fails its citi-
zens. States that have failed, or perpetrated gross rights violations upon 
their citizens, or systematically excluded individuals from participation, 
surely lose their political legitimacy tout court, and with it any legitimate 
authority to call their citizens to account and impose punishments upon 
wrongdoers.19 Duff’s claim to the effect that such a state, which so radi-
cally departs from the ideal, has lost its legitimacy either in imposing 
obligations or calling its citizens to account, is plausible.  
 But, Matravers asks, to what extent is this also the case for states—
states such as the U.K.—that are surely not failed states or gross violators 
of citizens’ rights, and thus are not wholly illegitimate, but nonetheless 
contain significant distributive injustice, and in particular, significant 
degrees of deprivation.20 Phrases such as “social exclusion” are apt for cer-
tain groups or individuals in contemporary U.K. social and political com-
munity. In such contexts, is it plausible to maintain that the state has lost its 
standing (to impose obligations, to call its citizens to account via the judi-
cial and penal system)? Such a claim is required if we are to maintain that 
social or distributive justice is a precondition for a legitimate penal sys-
tem, in addition to other conditions of general legitimacy. Moreover, this 
claim, about distributive justice as a precondition, is required to make 
sense of those cases that Duff cites as ones in which the state may lose its 
standing (as mentioned above). Thus the plausibility of Duff’s stronger 
claim, that social disadvantage and deprivation can undermine the state’s 
standing to call to account and punish, is under scrutiny here. 
 
2.1. Standing in contexts of distributive injustice 
 
Such scenarios of deprivation are envisaged and considered (albeit 
briefly) by Duff, so let us here (following Matravers’s strategy) focus on 
                                                 
 19As Duff emphasizes, to maintain that the state cannot call individuals to account 
and punish them for crimes is not to deny that the crime was wrong, nor that the victim 
has been seriously wronged. The issue is rather that the state’s subsequent role in address-
ing that wrong is undermined. 
 20For detailed statistical analysis of data on poverty in the U.K., see http://www.poverty. 
org.uk/summary/key%20facts.shtml. 
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one such case. 
 
Case 1: An impoverished single parent steals clothes from a supermarket 
for her children or defrauds the social security system by concealing her 
earnings. 
 
Let us for now grant that the state may lose its standing to call the indi-
vidual in Case 1 to account for her theft. Even if we grant this, we should 
surely not accept the general claim that the state loses its standing.     
Matravers comments that  
 
even if one thinks that the UK is blighted by significant distributive injustice [such as in 
Case 1], it is surely not, at least yet, the case that the situation is so bad that general legal 
and moral obligations between citizens and between citizens and the state have broken 
down.21 
 
Rather, the state’s loss of standing is only plausible if it is restricted in 
the following ways. 
 
Value-relative claim: While standing may be all or nothing, it is also do-
main specific. That is, while the state might have lost its standing with 
respect to the crimes of theft or fraud that flow from the parent’s impov-
erishment, it surely has standing to hold her answerable for other crimes 
(such as assault, murder). More generally, we might say that a state may 
lose standing in one domain, with respect to the relevant value(s) in that 
domain. But it can maintain standing with respect to other values. Thus 
the loss of standing of the state should be understood as pertaining only 
to some value—a value that it is plausible to see both the alleged of-
fender and the state as disregarding (thus explaining why it is unreason-
able for the state to hold the individual to account, with respect to that 
value).  
 
 We should also add to Matravers’s claims the following observation: 
 
Person-relative claim: The standing of the state to call individuals to ac-
count will surely vary from individual to individual. While the state 
might not have the standing to hold answerable the parent in Case 1 
(with respect to certain crimes such as theft), we surely want to maintain 
that the state can hold other affluent and privileged individuals in society 
answerable for thefts. More generally, then, we might say that if the state 
loses standing, it will do so only in relation to those individuals with re-
spect to whom the state has shown no regard for the relevant value. 
 
                                                 
 21Matravers, “‘Who’s Still Standing?’” p. 328. 
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 These considerations are instructive in helping us to see what is 
wrong with the case that Duff makes for social justice as a precondition 
of legitimate penal systems. If his claim that the state loses its standing to 
call citizens to account as a result of such injustice is to be at all plausi-
ble, this will be a value-specific loss of standing; and, I have added, it 
will plausibly be a loss of standing with respect to one particular person 
(or group). That is to say, it will be a loss of standing with respect to this 
individual, and this particular crime committed. 
 With these clarifications in mind, we can now turn to look at one of 
Matravers’s key claims. He writes: 
 
[I]t is critical to ask whether the [parent] can properly deploy the argument that she is not 
answerable to this state given its treatment of her. How might she do this? One way 
would be to try to show that the state has violated the very same values that it now ap-
peals to in calling her to account [see the value-relative claim, above].  
 This, though, is quite difficult. Grant that the woman is impoverished as a result of 
distributive injustice that the state does nothing to correct. Unless the account of that 
injustice involves something like the thought that “all property is theft,” the connection 
between the value flouted by the [mother] and that flouted by the state will only hold at 
some fairly abstract level. The state, it could be said, has violated the value of equality—
or equal respect—in allowing an unjust distribution of social and economic goods, and 
that has some connection with the value violated by the shoplifter, but the precise rela-
tionship is unclear.22 
 
Matravers thus concludes that “the analysis is unworkable”; he doubts 
that there is a systematic and consistent way of working out when the 
state has standing, with respect to what value, and which individuals. Let 
us get this worry into sharper focus. We have seen (and added to) the 
limitations that apply to the loss of standing of the state in situations of 
distributive injustice: of particular relevance are the value-relative claim 
and the person-relative claim. These claims, and the intuitions that sup-
port them, indicate that the loss of standing occurs only in a fairly re-
stricted manner—in certain circumstances, with respect to certain indi-
viduals (or groups) and for certain crimes.  
 But as we have seen, the kind of value that one can specify as one that 
both the individual and the state disregard (the former in the criminal act; 
the latter in its prior treatment of the alleged offender) is very general: 
the value of equality, or equal respect. Indeed, we will see that insofar as 
the values in question are so general, the account is not merely unwork-
able due to complexity and lack of systematicity, but such generality 
yields claims in conflict with the two plausible claims outlined above. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 22Ibid., p. 327. 
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2.2. Problems meeting the value-relative and person-relative claim 
 
Suppose the parent maintains that the state has disregarded the value of 
equal respect. This will mean that the state has lost its standing not just 
with respect to these particular crimes of theft, but with respect to a range 
of other crimes that are based on the value of equal respect (including 
assault, for instance). In discussing the value-relative claim and Case 1, 
we noted that while the individual may not be answerable for the theft, 
she surely would be for an assault or murder. But if the state has lost its 
standing with regard to all claims concerning equal respect, then the state 
could not hold her answerable for assault or murder. 
 Moreover, insofar as the state has not treated the parent with equal 
respect, this value has been violated generally. Insofar as the state has 
treated just one individual with less respect than its other citizens, each 
citizen can now complain that they have not been treated with equal re-
spect (they have each been accorded a greater amount of respect than 
another). Of course, this treatment will not be acutely felt by those whom 
the unequal treatment has not harmed (and has perhaps benefited). But in 
principle, each citizen could now claim that, as the state had disregarded 
the value of equal respect—in its treatment of them as much as its treat-
ment of the disadvantaged parent—the state has also lost its standing to 
call them to account for crimes pertaining to equal respect. 
 Note that structurally, this latter claim will also obtain if the matter in 
question is that “all property is theft” (and hence that the state lost its 
standing by promoting or permitting the negative value of a capitalist 
system of private property, perhaps). Insofar as the state has lost its 
standing by permitting such disvalue (all have been wronged by the capi-
talist system permitted, say), each citizen can disavow the state with re-
spect to this value. Thus an oil baron and the impoverished parent can 
both claim not to be answerable to the state for thefts or frauds.  
 Let us recap the structure of the argument here. In short, the claim 
that the state loses its standing in contexts of distributive injustice only 
appears plausible if restricted to loss of standing with respect to particu-
lar crimes, and particular individuals. But when it comes to specifying 
why the state has lost its standing with respect to a particular individual 
who has committed a particular crime, things get tricky: we cannot satis-
factorily specify a value that the state has failed to adhere to, such that it 
also makes sense to claim that the state cannot call the individual to ac-
count for her crime (which also violated that value). If the value is one 
that both the individual and the state have violated, its specification is so 
general that the person- and value-relative claims cannot be met. 
 This challenge from Matravers is persuasive. Moreover, by bringing 
his worries into sharper focus, we have seen that the claim that a disad-
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vantaged individual could not be called to answer (due to the state’s lack 
of standing) cannot be reconciled with certain plausible restrictions on 
any loss of standing. I think this challenge does enough to undermine 
Duff’s argument for the claim that the institution of punishment relies for 
its legitimacy on preconditions of social justice, in which the state dem-
onstrates sufficient integrity to call its citizens to account. That any fail-
ure of accountability seems to be particular, and not general, perhaps 
gives plausibility to the Bazelon school of thought, whereby a particular 
individual is identified as suffering diminished responsibility as a result 
of the conditions of deprivation.23 
 However, I think we ought not to reject Duff’s general strategy in fa-
vor of the Bazelon—“diminished-responsibility”—framework, for an 
independent line of argument can be given for the precondition Duff ar-
ticulates. In the following sections, I advance this line of argument. A 
crucial premise of the argument is that any institution of punishment 
must be constrained by a principle of proportionality. I briefly spell out 
this constraint, before utilizing it in argument. 
 
 
3. Proportional Punishment 
 
The consideration I raise here is not a precondition of legitimate punish-
ment, but rather a constraint on the application of punishment. It is a 
constraint that any practicable legal and penal system should incorporate, 
for the intrinsic and instrumental reasons I set out in this section. In the 
cases in which it has been determined that an individual ought to be pun-
ished, the question remains: how much punishment should be imposed? 
Different theories will yield different answers to this question, but all 
should adhere to the following structural constraint: 
 
(P) The amount of punishment should be assigned systematically, and 
not be disproportional. 
 
This principle requires more detailed spelling out. The first issue to ad-
dress is the question of between what relata the proportionality relation is 
supposed to hold. Theories that are purely consequentialist may take one 
relatum of the proportionality relation to be some consideration other 
than desert—such as deterrent effect. I will not be concerned with those 
theories here.24 
                                                 
 23See Bazelon, “The Morality of Criminal Law,” p. 393. 
 24The inability for such views to rule out absolutely victimization (“punishment” of 
innocents for the sake of deterrent effect) is sufficient to justify our focus upon theories 
that incorporate desert-based constraints. But I will briefly return to such views later, 
showing how my argument also applies to these accounts. 
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 A number of theories of punishment give some role to desert, claim-
ing that a necessary condition for just punishment is that it is deserved—
namely, that punishment is only justly applied to some individual when 
this is because of some crime she has been found guilty of committing. It 
is quite usual to think of certain crimes as more serious than others, and 
hence as deserving more severe punishment. But against what measure is 
the deserved punishment established? Ted Honderich has focused on the 
grievances of the victim (and wider society) as an indicator of the seri-
ousness of the crime; the just amount of punishment is that necessary to 
appease these grievances.25 Alan Goldman maintains that it is possible to 
measure seriousness in terms of the extent of the rights-violation in-
volved in the criminal action; proportional punishment then requires that 
the punishment exacts a commensurate amount of rights-violation upon 
the wrongdoer.26 Any account faces difficulties in spelling out how the 
deserved amount of punishment is to be identified, but accounts such as 
these two are certainly problematic: there is no reason to think the griev-
ances of the victim will provide a consistent measure of deserved pun-
ishment, and Goldman’s claims about comparing rights-violations are 
somewhat opaque.  
 As our focus is on Duff’s claims, and as his remarks on the issue of 
proportionality are more illuminating than those just aired, let us focus 
on these. On the view he advocates (consistent with prevailing ortho-
doxy), proportional punishment is a matter of fit between seriousness of 
crime and severity of punishment.27 The seriousness of the crime, he 
writes, is a function of harm (not simply material harm, but the harm of 
the moral wrong in the crime) and the culpability of the wrongdoer. Call 
the output of this function (S). The punishment appropriate to a crime of 
seriousness (S), Duff claims, will be that able to communicate the appro-
priate amount of censure for that kind of crime.28 The appropriate pun-
ishment, then, communicates the amount of censure deserved by the of-
fender. In ascertaining what punishments fall within the range of propor-
tionality (thereby avoiding disproportionality), there are two specifica-
tions of (P) that must be considered: 
 
(P1) Absolute: A punishment should not be disproportional to the crime 
(i.e., should not be too severe or too lenient, relative to (S)). 
                                                 
 25Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (London: Hutchinson, 
1969). 
 26Alan H. Goldman, “The Paradox of Punishment,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 
(1979): 42-55. 
 27See Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, pp. 135-37. 
 28The communicative element is crucial to Duff’s view. There must be an attempt to 
communicate with the offender if the ideals of normative inclusion central to liberal poli-
ties are to be met. 
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This is in large part a matter of judgment, but we do have a sense of when 
certain punishments are not fitting (perhaps this is clearer than settling 
when punishments are fitting). For example, a punishment of one week for 
homicide, or 20 years for a traffic violation, would violate this principle. 
 Second, proportionality involves also: 
 
(P2) Relative: A punishment should not be disproportional to punish-
ments for similar crimes (i.e., should not be too severe or too lenient 
relative to the punishments for like crimes). 
 
For example, suppose A and B each commit comparably serious assaults. 
If one wrongdoer is sentenced to 5 years, the other to 15 years, (P2) is 
violated. Now, (P2) plays an important role in subsequent argument, so it 
is worth spelling out in a little more detail the significance of its role in 
the penal justice system. First, relative proportionality is an important 
part of public justice: justice must be seen to be done, and this requires 
that citizens have a clear sense of when this has and has not occurred.29 
Moreover, there is a need for the legal and penal systems to remain 
transparent: individuals should have a clear sense of the nature and ex-
tent of treatments that the state may impose upon them as a consequence 
of certain criminal undertakings.  
 Duff brings a further consideration to the table: crimes and deserved 
punishments must be dealt with at a certain level of generality, as too 
much attention to the specifics of the circumstances of the crime and the 
wrongdoer would mean the state could “intrude into matters that should 
not concern the law.” Thus a general scheme of relatively proportional 
punishments should “protect citizens from such overintrusive inquir-
ies.”30 I will return to this point later. 
 Matters of procedural justice are also relevant here: in the absence of 
clear guidelines, offenders may be subject to discriminatory and biased 
treatment (perhaps due to implicit biases of those involved). Within ex-
isting systems with clear guidelines, in the instances in which discretion 
is permitted there is evidence that this is exercised to discriminatory ef-
fect (again, this may or may not be the result of conscious decision). For 
                                                 
 29For instance, in a recent case in which a city banker subjected his wife to horrific 
assaults, his relatively low sentence was met with significant outcry. See http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/aug/24/ukcrime.gender. There was an important sense in which 
justice was not seen to be done. This case is important for thinking about punishment and 
its role; part of what is so egregious about the lenient sentence is, I think, the message it 
sends out about the acceptability of perpetrating domestic violence. This highlights that 
one key role we believe to be important in the legal and penal system is its role in shaping 
norms of behavior. Cf. Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” The 
Monist 49 (1965): 397-423. 
 30Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, p. 157. 
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example, a study by David Baldus, analyzing sentencing for homicides in 
Georgia over a decade, indicated that racial bias played a role in the sen-
tencing process, to devastating effect: black citizens convicted of murder 
were four times as likely to receive the death sentence if their victim was 
white rather than black.31 For all these reasons, the principle of relative 
proportionality (P2) plays an important role in a legitimate penal system. 
 This principle plays an important part in my argument. I now proceed 
directly to the argument for the claim that a precondition of legitimate 
punishment is distributive justice.  
 
 
4. Proportionality in Contexts of Deprivation 
 
The argument I present is straightforward. It can be presented as follows: 
 
(1)  A just legitimate institution of punishment contains, and is able to 
meet with sufficient regularity, principles of absolute and relative 
proportionality (P1) and (P2) above. 
(2) Meeting these principles (with sufficient regularity) requires sentenc-
ing guidelines for different kinds of crime (to ensure relative propor-
tionality), specifying the severity of punishments appropriate to the 
seriousness of the kinds of crimes committed (to achieve absolute 
proportionality). 
(3) In a context of significant distributive injustice, particular instances 
of crimes of broadly the same kind will differ significantly in seri-
ousness. 
(4) In contexts of significant distributive injustice, the absolutely propor-
tional punishment may differ significantly from the relatively propor-
tional punishments: (P1) and (P2) cannot both be met with sufficient 
regularity. 
(C) The justness and legitimacy of a penal system is threatened by condi-
tions of significant distributive injustice. 
 
 The rest of this section will be spent spelling out in more detail the 
crucial claims in these premises. I have already commented in some de-
tail on the notion of proportionality, which features in premises 1 and 2, 
and its role in penal systems. Thus my attention will be focused on the 
remaining two premises. In particular, I will spell out in more detail the 
following claims: first, why contexts of significant distributive injustice 
affect the seriousness of particular instances of crime; second, why these 
                                                 
 31For the data from Baldus, see McCleskey v. Kemp. The significance of such data for 
retributivist arguments against the death penalty is rigorously scrutinized in Thom 
Brooks, “Retributivist Arguments against Capital Punishment,” Journal of Social Phi-
losophy 35 (2004): 188-97.  
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differences in seriousness mean that (P1) and (P2) cannot both be met. 
 First, a brief note on the matter of distributive injustice, and how we 
should understand this, is in order. Duff does not give a full account of 
social or distributive justice, but rather supposes that it is clear that there 
is some injustice that befalls individuals who suffer severe deprivation, 
or who are disadvantaged in the ways described in the example. The mat-
ter of what theory of distributive and social justice we should accept, and 
what levels of distributive and social justice are required for normative 
and material inclusion in a community (and penal legitimacy more gen-
erally) is an important one. However, it is too large a task to be under-
taken here. Rather, I will suppose that such conditions of disadvantage 
are unjust, and that an adequate theory of social justice would diagnose 
them as such. I think this is a plausible assumption, and one that is sup-
ported by, for example, Rawls’s notion of the “constitutional essen-
tials”—those basic rights and liberties that any reasonably just institution 
will secure. These constitutional essentials include freedom of move-
ment, of choice of occupation, and a social minimum that secures the 
basic material needs of all citizens.32 Moreover, this thought is consistent 
with Duff’s emphasis on normative inclusion in the ideal political com-
munity—that justice in that community must ensure a level of provision 
for each citizen means that it will likely involve some level of redistribu-
tion. We can thus see the range of theories of social and distributive jus-
tice that will be in play.  
 Further, we can append the example (of the impoverished parent, con-
sidered above) to make clear that the circumstances of want (as is the 
case in many instances of disadvantage or deprivation) result not from 
foolishness or poor motivation on the part of the disadvantaged, but 
rather from bad circumstantial luck, or more likely, a cumulative and 
pervasive infrastructural (and sometimes overt and personal) bias.33 We 
need only to consider the data that report that, for example, in the U.K. 
around two-fifths of people from ethnic minorities live in low-income 
households—twice the rate for white people—to see the plausibility of 
this assumption.34 That disadvantage tracks identity traits such as race, 
gender, and class should confirm the injustice it entrenches.  
                                                 
 32See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), pp. 227-30. 
 33For a comprehensive and forceful case that gender inequalities are perpetuated by 
structural features of our society (the work place and familial structures in particular) see 
Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 
 A further note on this point: I do not think it is clear that justice does not demand 
redistributive measures even when the disadvantage results from foolish measures or 
poor motivation. However, I turn attention away from these cases as they are more con-
troversial. 
 34See http://www.poverty.org.uk/06/index.shtml?2 (accessed May 1, 2009). 
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 Finally, I will focus here on contexts in which citizens are existing in 
conditions of deprivation. These cases are those that will most clearly 
and unequivocally be identified by a number of theories of social or dis-
tributive justice as unjust disadvantage. Moreover, it is plausible that, 
whatever the obligations of the state to its citizens, it is obliged to pre-
vent its citizens from falling into or occupying such conditions of depri-
vation. From now on, therefore, I will focus on such cases of deprivation, 
and argue that the eradication of these is necessary for the legitimacy of a 
penal system. Precisely what measure of distributive justice is required 
beyond this for the legitimacy of the penal system is a question I set 
aside for another occasion. 
 
4.1. Crime in context: justification and excuse, moral and legal 
 
I here provide support for the premise that certain contexts can affect the 
seriousness of particular instances of crime. The thought that the context 
in which a wrong has been perpetrated can affect our moral evaluations 
is not unfamiliar. Indeed, it is a thought that most undergraduate philoso-
phy students meet and embrace in the form of Kant’s murderer at the 
door: most agree that lying is wrong in many circumstances, but are will-
ing to maintain (contra Kant) that it is significantly less blameworthy 
(somewhat excused), and perhaps even permissible (wholly justified), to 
lie when that lie is told to a potential murderer, and when the lie is in-
tended to avert a murder. In such circumstances, an action that is gener-
ally wrong might be less blameworthy if undertaken, or perhaps even 
justified (and so not blameworthy at all). That features of particular cir-
cumstances might alter the moral worth, or even the permissibility, of an 
action type (such as lying) is a common feature of our moral thinking. 
 While it is a common feature of our moral evaluations, Nomy Arpaly 
points out that “this distinction between moral desirability [of an action] 
and moral worth [praise or blameworthiness of the agent] is often ig-
nored in casual (and sometimes serious) philosophical discussion.”35 
Care must be taken, she thinks, in separating out the moral character of 
an action (we might find the action of fraud morally undesirable and le-
gally criminal) and the moral character of the agent who so acts—our 
evaluation of whom might differ according to the circumstances in which 
they act (on Arpaly’s view, this differs according to the reasons to which 
they were responding).  
 So we might acknowledge both that lying is morally undesirable, but 
also that the agent who tells a lie in order to alleviate suffering (say, by 
concealing upsetting information) is less blameworthy (if at all so) than 
                                                 
 35Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 69. 
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an agent who lies because she enjoys deception. The circumstances of 
our actions, then, sometimes provide reasons for performing an undesir-
able action that can reduce the blameworthiness of an agent who so acts. 
This feature of the moral landscape can be captured by saying that some-
times, circumstances excuse certain actions—where by this we mean that 
they reduce, or wholly remove, blameworthiness for performing a mor-
ally undesirable act. It is important to note that nothing in our lying ex-
ample indicates that the agent is less than a fully responsible agent. The 
circumstances do not lead us to judge that she is not responsible, but 
rather that, as a responsible agent responding to reasons, she is less 
blameworthy for so acting than she might otherwise be. 
 Now, Duff endorses the claim that “the exculpatory concepts of justi-
fication and excuse used in criminal law should, at least in principle, be 
intelligible as formalised, perhaps modestly adapted versions of the ex-
culpatory concepts of justification and excuse as used in extra-legal 
moral contexts.”36 We should ask, then, in what ways the notions of justi-
fication and excuse differ in the moral and legal realms, and whether 
there is room for the distinction between the desirability of an act and the 
blameworthiness of the agent. 
 One way in which the legal notion of excuse differs from our moral 
notion is with regard to the notion of intention. In moral contexts, “I 
didn’t intend to x” or “I didn’t realize/believe I was x-ing” serves as an 
excuse that usually exculpates wholly from moral responsibility from x-
ing, so far as the belief is reasonable. (Perhaps one didn’t realize one’s 
utterance was a lie, say—then we don’t hold one responsible or blame-
worthy for lying, insofar as that belief is reasonable.) In contrast, in law 
mens rea (roughly, intention to perform the criminal action) is a require-
ment for a case being brought to trial. Thus, if relevant, this will have 
already been established, and will not be one of the eligible candidates 
for legal excuse. 37 
 However, there are similarities with respect to other excuses in legal 
and moral contexts, namely, excuses of irrationality (the agent (perhaps 
temporarily) lacking the rational capacities to understand that her action 
was wrong) or hard choice (such as under conditions of coercion) are 
present in both domains.38 Note the slightly different nature of each ex-
cuse: the first (irrationality) excuses by showing that the agent simply 
was not a responsible agent at the time of committing the criminal of-
                                                 
 36R.A. Duff, “Excuses, Moral and Legal: A Comment on Marcia Baron’s ‘Excuses, 
Excuses’,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (2007): 49-55, p. 50. 
 37Strict liability is the exception. 
 38For a full discussion of legal excuses, and their theoretical underpinnings, see 
Stephen J. Morse, “Excusing and The New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual 
Review,” Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 23 (1998): 329-406. 
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fense. The second kind of excuse (hard choice) need not entail that the 
agent lacked responsibility—rather, it encapsulates a substantive moral 
judgment that it is not appropriate to blame someone (who may be a fully 
rational, responsible agent) for an action performed under significant 
duress (such as in “gun to the head” and other coercive situations).  
 Now, if excuses in legal contexts are to correspond to the way we ex-
cuse in nonlegal contexts, as Duff suggests, then there will be a third role 
that excuse might play, similar to the second: excuses might be offered to 
indicate that the agent is less blameworthy for acting in the circum-
stances she did, for the reasons she did—but, she is nonetheless respon-
sible for so acting, and is to some degree blameworthy. 
 This kind of excuse sits between the “hard or coerced choice” excuse, 
and the claim that, under the circumstances, the conduct was in fact wholly 
justified. It is a familiar thought that countervailing considerations might, 
in exceptional cases, serve to wholly override a usually wrongful action. 
Justification for so acting may serve to relieve the alleged wrongdoer from 
all charges of criminal conduct. A case of this kind recently received much 
media attention in the U.K. Climate camp activists at King’s North 
power station were acquitted of charges of criminal damage. Having 
written a slogan encouraging the prime minister to refrain from re-
activating the coal burning power station (“Gordon, bin it!”) on the side 
of the coal power station, it was deemed that such an act was justified by 
the urgency of the environmental reasons on which they were acting.39 
 To summarize, then: an agent’s criminal action may be justified, or 
excused. If justified, it is determined that the usually wrongful action was 
in fact not, under the circumstances, wrongful. There are three different 
ways in which criminal action might be excused, all three of which pre-
suppose that the action performed was criminally wrongful:  
 
(E1) The agent may be excused on grounds of irrationality, in which 
case she is exonerated from guilt for so acting, for she was not at 
the time of the crime a responsible agent. 
(E2) The agent may be excused due to coercive circumstances, in which 
case we acknowledge that she was a responsible agent, but judge it 
understandable that responsible agents so act under circumstances 
of duress, and so do not hold such agents legally culpable and do 
not subject them to blame or censure for doing so. 
(E3) The agent may be excused due to the circumstances of her action, 
in which case we acknowledge that she was a responsible agent, 
and indeed blameworthy to some degree, but less blameworthy for 
                                                 
 39The activists did not succeed in inscribing the entire message, thus the chimney 
stack remained a totemic homage to the prime minister: “Gordon.” For more details, see 
http://www. guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/11/activists.kingsnorthclimatecamp. 
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so acting than she might have been in different circumstances, for 
different reasons. 
 
The former two roles, (E1) and (E2), that excuse might play, in legal con-
texts, address the question of the agent’s guilt—whether she should be 
punished at all for her action. The third kind of excuse, (E3), however, is 
relevant to the issue of how blameworthy an agent is for so acting. As 
such, in legal contexts, this becomes a matter of how much an agent 
should be punished.40 That is to say, excuses of this kind will play a role 
as mitigating factors, at the stage of sentencing.  
 I want to argue that conditions of disadvantage or deprivation can 
play a role in excusing in the third way—as a mitigating factor at the stage 
of sentencing—and suggest that this poses difficulties for the two propor-
tionality constraints. Perhaps sometimes deprivation will be so severe 
that it is appropriate to treat these cases as ones of “hard choice” or du-
ress. However, I focus here on the role of disadvantage as a mitigating 
factor, for many cases of disadvantage will, while thoroughly unpleasant, 
fall short of being cases of “do or die” absolute necessity or duress. 
 
4.2. Excuse in contexts of distributive injustice 
 
Recall that the severity of a punishment should fit the seriousness of the 
crime, and that seriousness is a function of harm (H) and culpability (C). 
Now, if culpability—or blameworthiness—is lessened due to contexts of 
disadvantage, then (assuming H is a positive integer) it will follow that 
the output of the function (S) will also be reduced, and the punishment 
ought to be less severe.41 
 I now want to argue that in some—perhaps many—cases, the serious-
ness of a crime is lessened due to conditions of deprivation. On the basis 
of the above considerations, two kinds of claim might be offered: 
 
(1) The alleged criminal wrongdoing was in fact justified in that context. 
(2) The alleged criminal wrongdoing should be excused, in some meas-
ure, in that context. 
 
If either of these claims is true, then conditions of disadvantage and dep-
rivation may lessen the seriousness of the crime (insofar as excuse less-
ens or removes blameworthiness). I think it plausible that (1) can be true, 
                                                 
 40(E2), if offered as partial defense, can also play this role. 
 41Note that because seriousness of a crime is a function of harm and culpability, we 
must say that the seriousness is reduced when culpability is reduced (or else the coerced 
and noncoerced agents should be punished alike). This is not, of course, to say that the 
victim was any less harmed (this goes for excuses of the “hard choice” kind as well as 
those I argue for here). 
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although perhaps only in contexts of very severe social injustice or dep-
rivation. For example, acts of civil disobedience such as those engaged in 
in the civil rights movement in the U.S. can surely be justified, although 
they technically amount to cases of criminal wrongdoing.  
 However, I think that (2) is true where the relevant contexts fall short 
of gross social injustice but nonetheless contain significant deprivation. 
This will include a far broader range of cases. Ordinary moral thinking 
supports this claim. Consider the following comparison cases: 
 
(A) Deprivation: A person without access to income or the resources to 
provide herself with food or shelter persistently steals food from a 
supermarket. 
 Comparison: A person with adequate resources to provide herself 
with food and shelter persistently steals food from a supermarket. 
 
(B) Deprivation: An underemployed single parent of three children de-
frauds the benefit and taxation system. 
 Comparison: An adequately employed and generally well-off single 
parent of three children defrauds the benefit and taxation system. 
 
Suppose that the cases are straightforwardly as I describe them, and there 
are no complicated explanations for the wrongdoing in each comparison 
case. Let us for now focus on our moral evaluations of the actions in dif-
ferent contexts. Thus described, it is not in any way revelatory to note 
that the moral evaluation of the comparable actions in A, B—of theft and 
fraud—differs significantly, and this is due to the context in which that 
action occurs. The agents in “deprivation” cases, who are unable to pro-
vide for themselves, or others, have (presumably) reasons for so acting 
that are quite different from those of their more fortunate counterparts in 
“comparison” cases. Concern for sustenance, provision, and safety moti-
vates the criminal acts in each deprivation case, in a way that is not so in 
each comparison case of relative adequacy. The differential contexts 
mean that there are countervailing considerations that may go some way 
towards mitigating blame for the criminal wrongdoing. 
 If we are to account for this intuition, how best should we understand 
the claim that deprivation lessens blameworthiness? Those of the 
Bazelon school of thought would maintain that deprivation provides an 
excuse of kind (E1)—it undermines the capacities of individuals, thus 
making it inappropriate to hold the agent responsible. I have already 
aired reasons for which this understanding is unappealing. Alternatively, 
we might maintain, in line with (E2), that the conditions of disadvantage 
are coercive to the extent that all blame is removed for so acting (struc-
turally analogous to a “gun to the head” coercion). This may be true of 
some conditions of disadvantage—but as mentioned, there will be many 
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cases of disadvantage that, albeit pretty dreadful, are not “do or die” 
situations. In these cases, we should say that (E3) the agent is responsible 
for her action, but is simply less blameworthy than she might be in other 
circumstances (say, in circumstances of relative privilege). This claim 
does not entail that the action performed is not wrong (morally or crimi-
nally). Nor does it entail that the agent involved was not morally respon-
sible for so acting, or that the agent is not liable to any degree for the 
criminal act. Nor does it deny that they ought not have so acted, or that 
serious consequences may ensue. 
 Rather, the claim is rather that the agent’s culpability for so acting is 
reduced, and that this is due to the circumstances of deprivation. This is 
the way I think that contexts of deprivation can affect criminal justice: 
namely, in such contexts of distributive injustice, the relative seriousness 
of crimes committed will vary (with culpability) across contexts. If this is 
right, then we should accept (2)—the alleged criminal wrongdoing 
should be excused, in some measure, in that context—in contexts of dep-
rivation. In a legal framework, this entails that deprivation can serve as a 
mitigating factor at the sentencing stage.  
 Should we also accept the stronger claim (1)—the alleged criminal 
wrongdoing was in fact justified in that context? I mentioned that there 
may be some extreme cases in which we should. However, I will focus 
mainly on claim (2), for this kind of case is plausibly more common, it is 
weaker, and, moreover, it is all that I need for my argument. It is worth 
noting, though, that there are surely conditions in which the boundary be-
tween excuse and justification are slim. That is to say, we can surely imag-
ine cases of deprivation in which, while we want to maintain that the con-
duct was in fact unjustified, the urgency of the situation was such that the 
wrongdoer is almost entirely blameless. I next defend the claim that these 
considerations ought to be taken into account when assigning punishment. 
 
4.3. Incorporating deprivation as a mitigating condition 
 
I have suggested that conditions of deprivation might excuse the wrong-
doer to the extent that her blameworthiness for so acting is significantly 
reduced. This point is in line with our moral evaluations, I have argued, 
and moreover, can be incorporated into a legal framework. We can main-
tain that a particular kind of action is sufficiently harmful that laws 
should be instated to govern conduct with respect to that act (to discour-
age so acting, to deter individuals from doing so, perhaps); we can iden-
tify that action as a criminal act. But fully responsible agents who so act 
may do so for a range of reasons, and the reasons for which they do so 
might radically alter the blameworthiness of the agent, and the sentence 
thus deserved. This, again, is a familiar feature of moral thought: we 
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think that an agent who stole in order to gain malicious satisfaction at 
violating another’s property is significantly more blameworthy than an 
impoverished agent who stole to gain sustenance. Indeed one might think 
that under the latter circumstances, theft is wrong, but the agent is only 
minimally blameworthy for so acting. These discriminations in moral 
worth—in the degree to which the agent is blameworthy—can be mir-
rored in our evaluations of how much punishment is deserved. 
 Why should the sentence that an individual receives reflect the extent 
to which she is blameworthy? First, we have seen the claim that the seri-
ousness of the crime is a function of harm and culpability. Insofar as it is 
plausible to see culpability (blameworthiness) as reduced by excuse (in 
accordance with (E3)), and insofar as circumstances of deprivation serve 
to mitigate blameworthiness, it is plausible to maintain that the legal 
structures can make room for the kind of nuances that characterize our 
moral thinking. Second, the legal frameworks ought to make room in this 
way. For if the penal system is concerned with the application of the de-
served amount of punishment, establishing the blameworthiness of the 
wrongdoer is required. On Duff’s view, the concern is to ensure that the 
right amount of censure is communicated in the punishment: insofar as 
an individual is less blameworthy, less censure will be required. Third, 
the “ought” here is morally urgent—the state ought to take into account 
the amount of punishment deserved, and punish accordingly. If the state 
punishes too severely, it will be unjustly imposing the excess punish-
ment. Thus, if the state is to avoid such unjust punishments, it ought to 
attend closely to the matter of how much punishment is deserved; that is, 
it ought to attend to the blameworthiness of the wrongdoer. I will shortly 
show how doing so, however, can pose difficulties for a penal system 
regarding the proportionality constraints that I set out in section 3. First, 
however, it is worth briefly noting why it is that this move from reduced 
moral blameworthiness to reduced legal culpability, with respect to of-
fenders in contexts of deprivation, has not been adequately elucidated. 
 When considerations of social injustice have been considered with 
regard to punishment, the role of excuse has predominantly figured in the 
sense of (E1); namely, in accordance with the Bazelon line of thought, 
attention is paid to the responsibility of the wrongdoer. For example, in a 
recent discussion of the relation and consequences of a “rotten social 
background” on criminal justice, Matravers focuses on the extent to 
which such a background undermines the agent’s responsibility for so 
acting. His focus is on the effect of social background upon the responsi-
bility related capacities of the agent (ability to understand and respond to 
considerations of right and wrong, very roughly put). Thus he writes that 
“unless past deprivation can be shown to have a continuing effect on the 
agent’s capacity [to grasp and apply reasons], it is irrelevant to judgments 
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of responsibility.”42 
 Likewise, Stephen Morse has argued to the effect that deprivation 
does not impact upon desert, and is concerned with rebutting arguments 
that purport to show such conditions undermine responsibility. In setting 
up the issue, he writes that “the law and morality alike exculpate either 
because an agent has not violated a moral prohibition or obligation we 
accept, or because the agent has violated a norm but is generally or situa-
tionally normatively incompetent.”43 Thus Morse concludes that we should 
not regard deprivation as an excusing factor, because “the excuse would 
tend pejoratively to label large numbers of citizens as less than full moral 
agents ... Social justice ... will not be furthered by treating deprived peo-
ple as if they were not morally accountable agents.”44 But in framing the 
issue in this way, Morse does not permit the more nuanced distinction I 
have drawn out between agents who while fully responsible (and norma-
tively competent) differ significantly in degree of blameworthiness.  
 With this distinction in hand, we have a different way of framing of 
the relationship between deprivation and culpability: we ought to say that 
the agent in disadvantaged or deprived circumstances is (ceteris paribus) 
responsible, and so she is blameworthy, and liable to be held answerable 
before the courts. Rather the extent of her blameworthiness for so acting, 
in this case, may be less than that of other agents who so act, and who 
have not suffered such deprivation. This is not because the deprivation or 
disadvantage in any way impinges upon the capacities of the agent, their 
standing as a responsible agent (I agree with Morse that the suggestion is 
somewhat distasteful and likely to have pernicious consequences). 
Rather the claim is simply that contexts of deprivation or disadvantage 
provide agents with significantly different reasons for action, and that 
these might sometimes, to some extent, excuse the criminal action, thus 
reducing the individual’s liability. 
 It is important to note that this distinction is relevant to U.K. law as it 
now stands. The specification of considerations that might reduce culpa-
bility runs together factors that remove responsibility for so acting with 
factors that do not remove responsibility, but rather reduce blameworthi-
ness. These factors include: (a) exploitation by others, (b) mental illness 
or disability, (c) youth or age, where it affects the responsibility of the 
individual defendant, (d) the fact that the offender played only a minor 
role in the offense.45 
                                                 
 42Matt Matravers, Responsibility and Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 130. 
 43Stephen J. Morse, “Deprivation and Desert,” in William C. Heffernan and John 
Kleinig (eds.), From Social Justice to Criminal Justice: Poverty and the Administration 
of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 114-60, at p. 121. 
 44Ibid., p. 154. 
 45See the sentencing guidelines website: http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/ 
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 While exploitation and the degree of involvement in the crime are 
factors that might serve to excuse (reduce blameworthiness), mental-
health problems or age-relevant considerations typically involve the claim 
that the agent was not fully responsible ((E1)-type excuse). There are two 
problems with this aspect of the sentencing guidelines: first, it fails to 
properly distinguish between factors that remove responsibility and those 
that accept responsibility but diminish blameworthiness. Second, and 
perhaps because of the failure to distinguish diminished responsibility 
from diminished culpability, there is no attention to deprivation as a fac-
tor that can reduce blameworthiness ((E3): mitigating factors).  
 
4.4. Dealing with objections 
 
Is there reason to resist the move from judgments of reduced blamewor-
thiness in the moral realm to comparable judgments in the legal realm? 
Jeremy Waldron has suggested, in considering precisely the kinds of 
cases under discussion here, that moral evaluations and judicial determi-
nations on this matter should come apart. He suggests that while the 
criminal action of an impoverished person may be morally justified, it 
cannot be legally justified. Were motives of deprivation-based necessity 
accepted as justificatory (in cases of, say, theft), he claims, the notion of 
property rights itself would be challenged: 
 
The law ... is not about to recognize a class of defense [“indigence-based necessity”] 
whose general tendency, in the cases in which it would be most directly applicable [cases 
of deprivation], would be to call into question the legitimacy of the general rules of prop-
erty in a society.46 
 
Waldron is perhaps correct to claim that the courts could not, insofar as 
they retain a commitment to property rights, allow that conditions of dep-
rivation justify acts of theft. That would indeed be to call into question 
the entitlement rights operative in our current system of property. But the 
argument I have given would not have this consequence of “unraveling” 
the state’s laws. I have claimed not that the act of (e.g.) theft is justified 
(claim (1), above), but rather that an individual’s impoverished condition 
can mean that she is significantly less blameworthy for this theft (claim 
(2), above). 
 William Heffernan likewise argues against accepting that considera-
tions of social justice could play an excusing role.47 This is precisely be-
cause, he claims, such considerations are contentious; one individual 
                                                                                                             
guidelines/council/final.html. 
 46Jeremy Waldron, “Why Indigence is not a Justification,” in Heffernan and Kleinig 
(eds.), From Social Justice to Criminal Justice, pp. 98-113, at p. 99. 
 47William C. Heffernan, “Social Justice/Criminal Justice,” in ibid., pp. 47-83. 
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might see unequal access to healthcare as a failing of social justice, an-
other might see taxation as a social injustice. If wrongdoers can defend 
their actions by claiming that it was justified “as a matter of social jus-
tice,” this will justify the criminal action of the rich tax-evader as well as 
that of the impoverished fraudster. Once again, the claims I have made 
can avoid this concern. First, I do not suggest that the action is justified; 
rather, blameworthiness is reduced. Second, the claim is not that the 
wrongdoer’s culpability is reduced because her action is in accordance 
with what social justice demands. Rather, my claim is that the reasons for 
which the individual so acted (survival, meeting of basic needs, say), are 
such that it is inappropriate to blame the agent to the same extent as an 
individual who acted for less urgent reasons. Debates about the correct 
theory of social justice need not now be engaged in (although I think 
they ought to be, elsewhere); one need only accept that such reasons are 
morally urgent, and so can serve to reduce culpability. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that the problems that face Duff’s account 
do not pose problems for the claims I have made. Duff faces difficulties 
in that his argument generates the conclusion that, in a context in which 
some citizens are socially disadvantaged, the state could not hold those 
disadvantaged individuals to answer for any crime; nor could the state 
hold other nondisadvantaged individuals responsible for their crimes. The 
framework I have proposed avoids this difficulty, by focusing not on the 
state’s standing with respect to individuals in particular, or in general, but 
rather on the justness of the punishments imposed upon individuals who 
exist in conditions of deprivation. While the focus is squarely on the in-
dividual, thus enabling fine-grained claims about individual blamewor-
thiness, we need not claim that the individual’s responsibility is reduced. 
Moreover, the claim I have made has significant implications for the 
state’s punitive authority in contexts of social disadvantage. In the next 
section, I go on to show that, in the presence of such mitigating factors, 
difficulties arise with regard to the proportionality conditions. 
 
4.5. Distributive injustice and proportionality 
 
Thus far I have argued for the following claim: culpability for particular 
crimes may vary in contexts of significant distributive injustice (such that 
some individuals suffer deprivations). Thus the seriousness of crimes 
will differ. This provides support for premise 3 of the argument above. In 
this subsection, I will provide support for premise 4, namely, the claim 
that in contexts of significant distributive injustice (i.e., those including 
deprivation), the proportionality constraints cannot be met. 
 Insofar as punishment must be proportional absolutely and relatively 
((P1) and (P2) above), significant distributive injustices threaten propor-
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tionality; in such contexts, both conditions cannot simultaneously be met. 
Why not? Consider the claim that the agent’s blameworthiness for an act 
of theft in a context of significant disadvantage is reduced. She is signifi-
cantly less blameworthy for so acting than were she in a context of rela-
tive privilege or stability, insofar as such contexts provide quite different 
reasons for so acting; these reasons for acting serve to excuse, thus re-
ducing culpability. 
 Now, if we accept the claim (which I think we should, for the reasons 
given above) that there are significantly varying degrees of blameworthi-
ness for criminal actions of the same kind (e.g., thefts of a certain value), 
then we should also accept, according to (P1), the following claim: 
 
(D1) The punishment, in terms of absolute proportionality, ought to differ. 
 
Recall that in reflecting on the degree of culpability of the agents who 
committed crimes in contexts of deprivation, I noted that we can imagine 
contexts so urgent that the strength of the excusing reasons are strong—
pertaining to survival or meeting of basic needs, for example. In such a 
case, the blameworthiness of the wrongdoer is almost wholly reduced 
(although responsibility remains); we admit they did wrong, but ac-
knowledge that they are hardly blameworthy for so acting. If this is so, 
then the absolutely proportional punishment would be fairly light. Con-
sider how we might frame this on Duff’s view: if the amount of punish-
ment required is that which communicates the appropriate amount of 
censure, then when the agent is almost wholly blameless for her crime, 
there is very little censure to be communicated. 
 However, this places the constraint on absolute proportionality ((P1), 
above and its contextualized version, (D1)) in tension with the constraint 
on relative proportionality (P2). If the severity differs significantly, then 
there will be difficulty in reconciling (P1) and (P2)—for a punishment 
that is absolutely proportional (attuned to the circumstances of the crime) 
may be quite different from punishments for similar criminal acts in quite 
different contexts (namely, contexts of stability or privilege). That is to 
say, two instances of the same kind of crime (theft, say) might differ sig-
nificantly in their seriousness, (S), due to significant differences in the 
wrongdoer’s culpability.  
 We might (somewhat artificially) specify that a kind of crime (theft) 
might require a certain amount of punishment according to (P2): n+/-10, 
say, where n is the starting point for the sentence guidelines, with +/-10 
being a matter of how much leeway there is for more or less severe pun-
ishment, in accordance with the presence of aggravating or mitigating fac-
tors, respectively. Now, the particular instance of the crime committed in 
conditions of deprivation might deserve, as a matter of absolutely pro-
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portionality, a punishment of n-20.48 That is to say, the usual variation in 
seriousness of crimes (due to the usual range of culpability) may permit 
certain upper and lower limits. But in cases of severe distributive injus-
tice, we have seen, blame can be almost wholly mitigated—thus it is 
likely that the usual range is narrower than would be required to reflect the 
severity of punishments appropriate to such crimes. In short, even the most 
lenient of the recommended sentences (n-10) is likely to correspond to a 
greater degree of blameworthiness than is present for certain crimes com-
mitted in contexts of deprivation. Accordingly, in a case in which the de-
served punishment is n-20, then if the punishment inflicted is n-10, the 
differential punishment is unjust; the person has been punished more than 
is deserved. Proportionality constraint (P1) is not met and unjust suffering 
has been imposed upon the wrongdoer, who is too severely punished. 
 Alternatively, the wrongdoer could be punished to the degree that is 
absolutely deserved (say, n-20). But then the principle of relative propor-
tionality (P2) cannot be met. Unless for certain crimes the guidelines for 
sentencing are expanded so as to make the most lenient sentence reflect 
the near lack of blameworthiness, they will not correspond to the degree 
of culpability in some of the cases of deprivation we have discussed. 
 This concludes my elaboration of the premises of the argument; I 
have undertaken to show: 
 
(3) In a context of significant distributive injustice, particular instances 
of crimes of broadly the same kind will differ significantly in seri-
ousness (due to differences in blameworthiness). 
 
I explained that, by looking at clear cases of injustice (conditions of dep-
rivation) we could see that culpability for criminal wrongdoing could be 
reduced; the conditions serve to excuse, to a certain extent, the wrong-
doing, and thus serve to significantly reduce liability.  
 I then explained that, given significantly varying degrees of blame-
worthiness, both proportionality principles could not be met. Insofar as 
absolutely proportional punishments are applied, they will not be rela-
tively proportional, across kinds of crime. And insofar as relative propor-
tionality for the relevant kinds of crime is met, absolute proportionality 
will not be: 
 
(4) In contexts of significant distributive injustice, the absolutely propor-
tional punishment may differ significantly from the relatively propor-
                                                 
 48This is especially so if we consider what is taken as the starting point of seriousness 
corresponding to n: “the assumption that the offender was motivated by greed.” Guideline 
on Theft and Burglary in a Building Other than a Dwelling, http://www.sentencing-
guidelines.gov.uk/guidelines/council/final.html, p. 5 (accessed February 19, 2009). 
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tional punishments: (P1) and (P2) cannot both be met with sufficient 
regularity. 
 
Thus injustices will be perpetrated if states continue to punish wrong-
doers for crimes in which the demands of absolute proportionality are 
less than those of relative proportionality. It is important here to note the 
inclusion of the clause “met with sufficient regularity”; any penal system 
will no doubt on occasion involve error, and these errors will be poten-
tially devastating for those involved. This clause is intended to rule out 
those cases of error—the legitimacy of a system should not be under-
mined by the occasional mistake, so long as those errors are guarded 
against and their occurrence not catastrophic. A penal system can be le-
gitimate when the maladministered justice is restricted to closely guarded- 
against error. In a context of deprivation, it seems clear that such mal-
administration will occur much more frequently; thus the legitimacy of a 
system in such a context is threatened. I thus conclude that in contexts of 
significant distributive injustice, a just and legitimate penal system is 
threatened.49 This is not to say that no punishments within that system 
are just; we are able to identify the particular cases of injustice, and thus 
avoid the failings of Duff’s view. Rather, the conclusion is that if a penal 
system is to operate justly in all cases (or as many cases as permitted, 
given human error), conditions of deprivation and disadvantage must be 
eliminated. This conclusion places the failing, in cases of deprivation, 
where it belongs: not with the individual and her capacities, but rather 
with the state that has failed to meet the basic needs of its citizens. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Is this right? I here consider two alternative options that might seem ap-
pealing, in order to avoid the conclusion that social injustice is a precon-
dition of penal legitimacy. I show that neither is feasible, and thus the 
remaining option—to alleviate such injustices—is morally urgent. 
 The problem, as I have set it out, is that some individuals—those in 
contexts of deprivation—are punished too severely for their crimes. Per-
haps steps can be taken to avoid this. One strategy would be to extend 
the sentencing guidelines (extend the range or relative proportionality for 
                                                 
 49This conclusion applies to consequentialist deterrence theory views of punishment 
also. In brief, in contexts of severe injustice, the strength of the threat (corresponding to 
the threatened amount of punishment) needed to deter an individual from criminal action 
will presumably vary greatly depending upon the individual’s circumstances. For in-
stance, greater threat is needed to deter an impoverished and starving individual from 
theft than a well provided-for individual. The structure of the argument is somewhat dif-
ferent, in application to these views, but the point still applies. 
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that kind of crime), so that the most lenient sentences are those that are 
absolutely proportional to the particular, reduced culpability crime (the 
range therefore being n+10/-20). 
 Could the range of sentences be extended so that the minimum sen-
tence is of this form? Perhaps, but I think there are difficulties with this 
strategy. These difficulties pertain to the role of proportionality in public 
justice. In particular, consider the role of punishment in ensuring that 
public justice is seen to be done. An important part of this is surely that 
the state is seen to take a stance on the wrongness of certain behaviors, 
perhaps in solidarity with the victims of crime. Moreover, the penal sys-
tem must be transparent and systematic: citizens should have a clear 
sense of the punishments that they may face.  
 If the range of sentences is too broad (the minimum being extremely 
lenient), neither of these purposes can be served. First, a crime for which 
the sentencing guidelines are very broad in the way described might fail 
to convey adequately the state’s condemnation of that kind of crime, and 
its concern to protect citizens from becoming victims of crime. A state 
must both administer just punishments, and condemn certain criminal ac-
tion. But it cannot adequately fulfill both of these functions where its citi-
zens exist in conditions of deprivation. If the former function is served 
(just punishments meted out, taking into account disadvantage as a miti-
gating factor), then we might worry that adequate condemnation cannot 
be thereby expressed. And punishments severe enough to so convey con-
demnation would be, for many disadvantaged citizens, unduly harsh.  
 Second, citizens may feel insufficiently clear on the kind of punish-
ment they could reasonable expect for a certain course of action, if the 
range of punishments extends from very lenient (in cases in which ex-
cuses are present) through punishments as severe as is deserved in cases 
in which no excuses mitigate culpability and cases in which aggravating 
factors increase it. To attempt to incorporate such lenient sentences as are 
absolutely proportional could not provide the clarity and systematicity 
that is required of such an institution. 
 An alternative strategy would be to leave the sentence guidelines 
(fairly) restrictive, so as not to accommodate such lenient sentences in 
general. Instead, the state might, in cases it deems appropriate, make in-
quiries into whether the case in hand should be seen as exceptional, and 
hence falling outside of those guidelines. However, Duff has already pre-
sented us with reasons to be wary of such a strategy: for the state to in-
vestigate the specific causes of a criminal act is for it to “intrude into 
matters that should not concern the law.” I have suggested that, in fact, 
such considerations are of concern to the law, insofar as they affect cul-
pability. Nonetheless, one might agree with Duff that such inquiries are 
intrusive, and that the state should “protect citizens from such over-
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intrusive inquiries.”50  
 An additional, and I think as pressing, concern pertains to the proce-
dural injustices that may be given rein if a “case by case” approach is 
adopted. I have already mentioned that racial bias has been shown, in the 
U.S., to influence sentencing. In the U.K., the rate of custodial sentenc-
ing for first conviction with female offenders is twice that for males on 
their first conviction. For female offenders, when both custodial sen-
tences and more lenient ones (such as fines or community orders) are 
available, there is a tendency to give the former.51 Thus the potential for 
such injustices in the process, where discretion is permitted, speaks in 
favor of a systematic approach in accordance with general guidelines. 
 Further, a difficulty that faces both of these strategies pertains to the 
difficulty of ascertaining precisely when disadvantage is a mitigating fac-
tor. I have been supposing throughout that we can ascertain that the con-
ditions of hardship play a motivating factor in the commission of the 
crime—and no doubt this is true of many cases. But perhaps this will not 
always be so; some agents may be motivated by ill will or disregard for 
the law, rather than hardship, and it will not always be easy to ascertain 
when this is so. In particular, where an agent’s condition falls short of 
absolute necessity (where we might reasonably infer that desperate hard-
ship motivated the criminal activity), it will be incredibly difficult to un-
tangle her reasons for action. The difficulty here is acute: first, agents 
often act for a number of reasons, and it is not easy to prise apart their 
contributing roles. If an agent is motivated to theft in part by hardship, 
but in part by ill will, to what extent should each motive be given weight 
in ascertaining blameworthiness? Second, agents sometimes act for rea-
sons that are not readily available on conscious reflection. Even with re-
flection, agents are prone to rationalization, or confabulation. This makes 
determination of reasons for action (one’s own no less than another’s) a 
difficult task. Recall Kant’s remark that 
 
in actual fact it is absolutely impossible for experience to establish with complete cer-
tainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, in other respects right, has rested on 
moral grounds and on the thought of one’s duty ... for when moral value is in question, 
we are concerned, not with the actions which we can see, but with their inner principles, 
which we cannot see.52 
 
The thought that our reasons for action are opaque to us finds further 
support in recent psychological findings on the prevalence of confabula-
                                                 
 50Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, p. 157. 
 5137 percent of female offenders with no previous convictions were given custodial 
sentences. See Corston, The Corston Report, p. 18. 
 52Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Part 2, Ak. 26:406. 
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tion and rationalization in agents’ reporting on reasons for action.53 
 Third, and related, even were an agent able to discern accurately her 
reasons for action, sometimes even sincere agents are not reliable report-
ers of their reasons for actions. This may be a problem in particular if 
agents are unable to clearly articulate their reasons for action.  
 Thus the connection I have been supposing—namely, that conditions 
of deprivation will contribute to an agent’s commission of crime—will 
be incredibly difficult to discern in a court of law. This is not to deny that 
there is such a connection, but rather to deny that it is the kind of evi-
dence that is readily available, and reliably submitted, as part of the 
criminal justice proceedings. 
 It should also be noted, of course, that to allow appeal to disadvantage 
as a mitigating factor is to risk exploitation of this strategy by insincere 
and disingenuous individuals. To punish such insincere individuals too 
leniently is problematic for reasons Richard Lippke raises, in considering 
whether we should punish the socially deprived at all. Such a strategy, he 
writes “would be to ... abdicate our responsibilities to the victims of their 
crimes, many of whom are themselves socially deprived.”54 
 For these reasons, approaches that require great sensitivity to individ-
ual motivation—quite apart from concerns pertaining to the propriety of 
the state’s intrusion into the private lives of its citizens to establish such 
matters—rely on access to facts about agents that are notoriously diffi-
cult to discern. When we add to these difficulties the concerns about bias, 
and the possibility of this informing evaluations of an agent’s motives, 
we see the full extent of the problems facing either approach. 
 Given these constraints, a surer route to securing justly proportional 
punishment at the same time as meeting considerations of public justice 
and procedural fairness is to alleviate the conditions of deprivation that 
serve to reduce culpability. Moreover, Lippke’s comment quoted above 
enables us to see that insofar as the circumstances of disadvantage 
(which lead to criminal activity, or make it appear a feasible option) re-
main, taking disadvantage into account as a mitigating factor does not do 
enough for those citizens who may be subject to such crimes in future. 
The state’s protective responsibilities towards potential victims of crimes 
should lead us to endorse the elimination of those conditions that con-
tribute to criminal activity—in particular, those conditions of disadvan-
tage or deprivation. Only this strategy can serve both punitive justice, 
and take seriously the state’s responsibilities to protect all its citizens, 
both from severe hardship and from crime. 
                                                 
 53William Hirstein, Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). 
 54Lippke, “Diminished Opportunities,” p. 480. 
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 Until conditions of poverty and deprivation are eliminated, a legiti-
mate and systematic penal system is not possible: for some already dis-
advantaged individuals will be punished too severely. As long as citizens 
suffer deprivation, the state is not merely failing its citizens by failing to 
provide the constitutional essentials, but punishing unjustly those indi-
viduals who commit crimes due to such circumstances, and failing in its 
protective responsibilities. Thus my argument provides urgent moral rea-
son for states to alleviate such conditions of impoverishment.55 
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